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CASE NOTE
Labor Law—Norris-LaGuardia Act—Arbitration Agreements—Federal
Courts May Enjoin Strikes in Breach of No-Strike Agreements.—Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Unions, Local 770. 1—In the recent
decision of Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union Local 770,
the Supreme Court re -examined and expressly overruled the holding
of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 2 Boys Markets involved a con-
troversy arising out of an employer's use of non-union help to pack a
frozen food container despite union' demands that the case be emptied
and repacked by union labor. Both parties were bound by a collective
bargaining agreement which contained, inter alia, provisions for griev-
ance hearings, arbitration, and a no-strike clause, with the decision
of the arbitrator binding upon the parties. Subsequent to the employer's
refusal to permit union members to empty the food cases the union
called a strike and began picketing his establishment.
The following day, the employer obtained a temporary restraining
order from the California Superior Court forbidding continuation of
the strike. The union removed the case to the Federal District Court
for the Central District of California in an attempt to quash the
injunction. The district court enjoined the union from striking and
ordered the parties to arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed this order on the grounds that the prohibitions against
federal injunctive relief expressed in Sinclair were controlling. 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and HELD: 4 The Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief for strikes in breach
of a no-strike obligation in a collective bargaining contract which con-
tains provisions for mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure.
The request for federal injunctive relief in Boys Markets was
based upon Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
which provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties. 6
Section 301(a) was enacted to open the federal courts to suits for
violations of collective bargaining agreements and thereby facilitate
1
 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
8 416 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1969).
4 398 U.S. at 253.
5 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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enforcement of such contracts by removing the statutory requirement
of a minimum amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship.° The
accompanying provisions in section 301(b) 7 enlarged this grant of
jurisdiction by removing some of the procedural disabilities blocking
suits against unions in state courts. Labor organizations, as unincor-
porated associations, had proven themselves procedurally immune
from suit in several' states, whereas employers, if incorporated, were
easily sued. 8
 This imposition of contractual liability upon labor unions
by section 301(b) supports an interpretation of section 301(a) as
merely a jurisdictional statute providing a federal forum for suits
involving collective bargaining agreements .° However, the basically
jurisdictional function of section 301(a) has supported a much broader
scope of federal labor law. The result of this initial grant of federal
jurisdiction has been the gradual development of a uniform body of
substantive federal labor policy."
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills," the
Supreme Court expressly held for the first time that suits under section
301 would be governed by federal law." In Lincoln Mills, the Court
upheld a district court order requiring an employer to comply with the
arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover,
the Court specifically rejected the contention that section 301 was a
merely jurisdictional statute, and held that the section authorized the
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements." This initial expansion of the role
e The significant legislative history of 11 301(a) is contained in an appendix to Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485-86 (1957). See also 93 Cong. Rec. 3839 (1947) (remarks of
Senator Taft), and Justice Traynor's comments in McCarron v. Los Angles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. App.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
7
 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1964). This section provides in part that any "labor organi-
zation may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents
in the courts of the United States."
8 93 Cong. Rec. 3839 (1947).
9 The interpretation that state court jurisdiction should not be pre-empted by
301(a) was first stated by Senator Ferguson on the senate floor in 1946:
(MR. FERGUSON.) Mr. President, there is nothing whatever in the now-
being-considered amendment which takes away from the State courts all the
present rights of the State courts to adjudicate the rights between parties in re-
lation to labor agreements. The amendment merely says that the Federal courts
shall have jurisdiction. It does not attempt to take away the jurisdiction of the
State courts, and the mere fact that the Senator and I disagree does not change
the effect of the amendment.
(MR. MURRAY.) But it authorizes the employers to bring suit in the Fed-
eral courts, if they so desire.
(MR. FERGUSON.) That is correct. That is all it does. It takes away no
jurisdiction of the State courts. 92 Cong. Rec. 5708 (1946), cited in 398 U.S. at
245.
10 Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1532 (1969).
11 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
12 Id. at 456.
13 Id, at 451. The Court adopted the reasoning set forth in the opinion of Judge
Wyzanski in Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp.
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of federal law in section 301 suits was upheld by judicial recognition
of the importance of a federal labor policy favoring arbitration as the
approved method of settling labor disputes."
Paralleling the development of substantive federal labor law,
however, was a trend in Supreme Court decisions indicating that
divisions between state and federal jurisdiction must still be recog-
nized in section 301. suits. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney," the
Court affirmed a state court judgment awarding damages for an em-
ployer's breach of a collective bargaining agreement. It was held that
section 301 was not meant to allow the federal courts to displace
completely state jurisdiction of suits for violations of labor-manage-
ment contracts."' This recognition of the importance of state disposition
of labor disputes was reemphasized in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas
Flour Co.," which affirmed the interpretation that section 301 does
not deprive state courts of jurisdiction over litigation involving collec-
tive bargaining contracts, and upheld a state court judgment awarding
damages for breach of a no-strike provision." It was further decided,
however, that while the states may still retain jurisdiction in section
301 suits, they must apply federal substantive law in the disposition
of these actions."
The limitation upon federal intervention in section 301 suits was
further extended by renewed emphasis of the anti-injunction provisions
of Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." In Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,21 a suit was brought by an employer in federal district court
under section 301 to enjoin a strike allegedly in violation of a no-
strike clause. The Supreme Court held that the controversy was a
"labor dispute" within the terms of Section 13 (c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,22
 and that federal courts were therefore prohibited
from enjoining the strike. In affirming dismissal of the suit, the Court
in Sinclair expressly held that actions arising under section 301 pre-
137 (D. Mass. 1953). In that case, judge Wyzanski stated that "[election 301 is drafted
in terms which appear to be exclusively jurisdictional. The statute does not expressly
state what law shall be applied to determine the rights of the parties or their remedies.
. . . It is a direction to develop a federal common Iaw in connection with the rights of
the parties.'.' 113 F. Supp. at 139.
14 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
18 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
10 Id. at 511.
17 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
18 Id. at 101.
12 Id. at 102.
2° 29 U.S.C. { 104 (1964).
21 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
22 The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 29 U.S.C. 113(c) (1964).
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sented no conflict with the anti-injunction proscriptions of the Norri-
LaGuardia Act."
Although the Sinclair decision specifically prohibited federal in-
junctive relief in section 301 suits, it left open the question of whether
state court actions under section 301 were removable to federal courts.
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735," a state court had enjoined a
strike in violation of a no-strike agreement. The union then removed
the case to federal district court as an action "arising under the laws
of the United States" within the meaning of the removal statui e." The
district court asserted jurisdiction in the case and dissolved the state
injunction. The Supreme Court in Avco upheld this action of the dis-
trict court, noting that suits arising under section 301 were properly
removable."
The Court in Boys Markets viewed the combined effect of Sinclair
and Avco as virtually displacing state jurisdiction in section 301 suits
since the option of removal and dissolution of state injunctions was
made available." More importantly, the prohibition in Sinclair against
injunctive relief in section 301 suits in federal courts was held contrary
to the federal policy of enforcing agreements to settle labor disputes
peacefully." The reversal of Sinclair was thus considered the necessary
means of avoiding both an unwarranted ouster of state jurisdiction and
frustration of an important segment of national labor policy. However,
as the Court in Boys Markets recognized, reversal of Sinclair and
subsequent approval of federal injunctive relief in section 301 suits
must be reconciled with the direct language of Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which expressly forbids the granting of an injunction
in a "labor dispute" by a federal court."
The majority in Boys Markets reasoned that federal injunctive
relief in section 301 suits could be granted through a process of accom-
modation with the anti-injunction policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The Court first examined the legislative history of section 301 to
attempt to support reconciliation with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
drafters of section 301 were aware of the inequities in existing statu-
tory coverage of labor problems. At the time of the passage of section
301, however, Congress failed to repeal or amend the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.8° This congressional failure to alter the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in response to the increased federal jurisdictional
grant in section 301 has been interpreted as conclusive evidence that
28 370 U.S. at 203.
24 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
25 28 U.S.C. 1 1441(b) (1964).
26 390 U.S. at 560.
27 398 U.S. at 244-45. See General Electric Co. v. Local Union 191, 413 F.2d 964 (5th
Cir. 1969), and Day-Brite Lighting Division v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 303
F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Miss. 1969) for additional examples of the dissolution of state in-
junctions by federal courts in § 301 suits.
23 398 U.S. at 249.
20
 Id. at 249-50.
16 93 Cong. Rec. 6445-446 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
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Congress intended the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia
to remain rigidly in force despite the passage of section 301. 3'
Nevertheless, the majority in Boys Markets stressed that the
effect of these anti-injunction provisions must be considered in the
context of labor practices at the time of their adoption. Prior to 1932,
Congress viewed the reaction of federal judges to labor disputes as
being guided by the conservative anti-labor attitude of the federal
judiciary." The Norris-LaGuardia Act attacked this judicial practice
by declaring federal courts improper agencies to formulate substantive
labor policy, and repudiated the federal common law of labor relations
by establishing a policy of government neutrality." The legislative
history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act thus indicates that Congress be-
lieved that courts were ill-suited to make policy in labor matters."
After 1932, however, Congress became more disposed toward regula-
tion of employer-union relations by assigning extensive adjudicatory
and enforcement responsibilities to the federal courts." This shift of
emphasis from the protection of the nascent labor movement to the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes created situations requiring the
federal courts to issue injunctions in order to effectuate the purposes
of the newer administrative statutes.
In addition to the altered relationship between the federal courts
and the labor movement, the Court in Bays Market noted that the
type of labor controversies with which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
framed to deal has changed significantly. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
was enacted at a time when the only labor disputes contemplated were
"battles of industrial warfare," as opposed to the present day contro-
versies concerning the terms and administration of collective bargain-
ing agreements." As a practical matter, to apply prohibition against
judicial interference in raw labor controversies to strikes in breach of
collective bargaining agreements is contrary to the intended effective
enforcement of such agreements." While the Court in Bays Markets
held that strikes involving collective bargaining agreements are "labor
disputes" within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," this type of
dispute was seen as sufficiently distinct from earlier controversies to
support modification of the present day effect of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
The Court in Sinclair had earlier considered and rejected both the
a1 370 U.S. at 205.
42 75 Cong. Rec. 5463 (1932) (remarks of Representative O'Connor).
83 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
84 See the remarks of Representative O'Connor, supra note 32.
85
 Three primary examples of this Increased federal regulation are the amendments
to the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 45 U.S.C. I§ 151-63 (1964) ; the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1964) ; and the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (1964).
88 Comment, Labor Arbitration and Anti-Injunction: The Case for Accommodation,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 898, 901 (1969).
47
 Steward, No-Strike Clause in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 678
(1961).
88 Supra note 22.
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arguments of the changed role of the judiciary in labor disputes and
the evolution of a different type of labor controversy as grounds for
modification of the anti-injunction policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act." The Sinclair decision held that the correct interpretation of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act required strict adherence to the plain language
of the Act without consideration of changed circumstances in its appli-
cation.° The Court in Boys Markets disagreed and held that full con-
sideration must be given to the total corpus of federal labor law that
has developed since passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Further-
more, the majority in Boys Markets stressed that the relevant policies
expressed in the Act must be adapted to changing circumstances, and
not be conclusively limited by a narrow interpretation of the language
of the Act itself.° This divergence of views concerning the interpreta-
tion of labor legislation is the crux of the distinction between the
rationales expressed in Sinclair and Boys Markets. Full discussion
of the opposing schools of thought concerning strict statutory con-
struction and more liberal interpretation that have so frequently
divided the Supreme Court is beyond the scope of this note. However,
interpretation of labor legislation in particular, because it involves
an area sensitive to change, would seem to require accommodation
with changing practices in labor-management relations if the policies
of the legislation are to be effectuated.
This liberalized interpretation of labor statutes expressed in Boys
Markets is supported by prior judicial reconciliation of existing sta-
tutes with laws added to the developing - framework of federal labor
law. The first effective accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to a newer statute involved the Railway Labor Act,' which provided
for administrative disposition of collective bargaining problems in the
railroad industry." The Supreme Court in Graham v. Brotherhood of
Firemen" upheld an injunction barring compliance with a racially dis-
criminatory collective bargaining agreement. The Court reasoned that
the otherwise absolute anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce
the positive mandates of the Railway Labor Act. This limited use of
injunctive relief was soon expanded in Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago River & R.R." In Chicago River, the Supreme Court
affirmed the issuance of an injunction to restrain a union from striking
while a dispute was pending before the National Railroad Adjustment
3D 370 U.S. at 201-02.
4° Id. at 202.
41 398 U.S. at 250.
42 Id.
43 45 U.S.C.	 151-63, 181-88 (1964).
44 For a comprehensive discussion of the Act see Risher, The Railway Labor Act,
12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 51 (1970).
45 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
" 353 U.S. 30 (1957). The propriety of the Chicago River accommodation of the
Railway Labor Act to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was recently reaffirmed in Seaboard
World Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers, 62 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,759 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Board (NRAB). The Court reasoned that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the Railway Labor Act were to be considered as integrated ele-
ments of a "pattern of labor legislation."' The two statutes were
therefore reconciled in the Court's holding that the anti-injunction
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not meant to frustrate the
function of the NRAB as a reasonable alternative to self-help. Fur-
thermore, protection of the jurisdiction of the NRAB was recognized
as essential to the policy of promoting stable industrial relations.°
The majority in Boys Markets adopted this accommodation ap-
proach used in Chicago River as a basis for its holding that federal
injunctive relief could issue to enforce no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements without violating the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4°
However, the situation presented in Chicago River is distinguishable
from that found in Boys Markets in that the former case involved
the enforcement of a statutorily established arbitration procedure,'
while the latter concerned a contractually established agreement to
arbitrate. This distinction was Overcome in Boys Markets by equating
the present day congressional emphasis upon the settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration with the express statutory mandate to
arbitrate relied upon in Chicago River." This analogy is supported by
language in the Chicago River decision itself which stressed congres-
sional endeavors to stabilize relations as additional grounds for order-
ing arbitration." While not strict precedent, therefore, the Chicago
River decision does properly support the accommodation process ap-
plied in Boys Markets.
Strong policy considerations prompted the Court in Boys Markets
to reach a decision requiring such difficult reconciliation with the
language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. One major objective of the
Court was to encourage uniformity in national labor policy." The
Court noted that Congress had specifically intended in enacting sec-
tion 301 (a) that the "doctrine of federal labor law uniformity" should
take precedence over contrary state law." The Court viewed the com-
bined effect of Sinclair and Avco as frustrating the policy of uniformity
by making the availability of injunctive relief dependent upon the
court chosen." Sinclair was therefore overturned partly because it led
to a forum-shopping situation that was contrary to the announced
federal policy of uniformity."
47 353 U.S. at 30.
48 See Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contem-
porary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 Yale L.J. 78, 81-82 (1960).
48 398 U.S. at 251.
60 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
81 398 U.S. at 252.
82 353 U.S. at 40.
68 398 U.S. at 241.
64 369 U.S. at 104.
86 398 U.S. at 244-45.
66
 This forum-shopping situation is accentuated by the fact that only 14 states
have provisions similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibition against injunctive relief.
398 U.S. 247-48 n.15,
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Uniformity in labor law has been firmly established as a desired
objective by the federal courts." However, there is considerable dis-
agreement as to the methods to be used in reaching this goal. Some
commentators have emphasized the necessity for uniformity in section
301 suits, but have advocated the full extension of the Sinclair hold-
ing to state courts as the means to achieve this result's Such further
application of Sinclair was recognized by the Court in Boys Markets
as a possible means of achieving uniformity, but this extension of the
anti-injunction holding in Sinclair was rejected because to so hold
would hinder the strong federal policy of supporting the use of arbitra-
tion as the approved method of resolving labor disputes."
Arbitration has received congressional approval as the most
desirable method of promoting the peaceful settlement of labor dis-
putes." The Supreme Court has emphasized this congressional policy
in a series of decisions beginning with Lincoln Mills." Later decisions
involving the application of section 301 have noted that the "arbitral
process" is closely connected with national labor policy as a whole,"
and that arbitration of grievances is an essential element in promoting
the federal policy of industrial stabilization." Moreover, the Court
has stressed the importance of the proper functioning of the arbitra-
tion process by limiting judicial review of arbitration awards to avoid
undermining the policy of settling disputes through arbitration."
While there is little disagreement as to the importance of arbitra-
tion as a national labor policy, there are sharply divergent views as
to the necessity for injunctive relief to enforce arbitration clauses.
The Court in Boys Markets saw the availability of equitable remedies
as being necessary to avoid "devastating implications for the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements."Ba However, it has been suggested
that the need for enforcement of arbitration agreements is met by legal
remedies presently available to employers such as disciplinary actions
against employees and suits for damages caused by illegal strikes."
Yet, the effectiveness of this type of remedy, as is pointed out by the
07
 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959), and
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). See generally Keen; The
Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and
Beyond, 15 Vill. L. Rev. 32, (1969).
58
 Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia
Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 980, 995 (1969).
55 398 U.S. at 247.
JO S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1947), dted by Justice Frankfurter
in his dissenting opinion in Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 529.
81 353 U.S. at 455.
62 See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572
(1960) (concurring opinion).
03
 See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
84 See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US.
593, 596 (1960).
°a 398 U.S. at 247.
00
 Donau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va. L. Rev. 427, 465 (1969).
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majority in Boys Markets," appears to be inferior to ending an illegal
strike by injunction. While, disciplining employees and actions for
damages are alternatives to injunctive relief, both methods are them-
selves often subject to arbitration. Hence, quick disposition of these
matters is delayed by the arbitral process itself and adequate, im-
mediate relief is often impossible."
More telling criticism of the use of injunctive relief in section
301 suits centers upon the appropriateness of the injunction itself as
a method of enforcing arbitration agreements. Opponents of the use
of injunctions in this area contend that most illegal strikes occur over
issues that are not in themselves proper subjects of arbitration, cre-
ating a situation in which injunctive relief would help little toward
settlement of the dispute." Further, despite widespread use of griev-
ance and arbitration procedures, most strikes do not specifically vio-
late the no-strike clause that may be in effect." Issuance of an
injunction when it is unclear whether the strike is violative of a no-
strike clause may destroy the employees' contractually unrestricted
right to strike," and may be determinative of the outcome of the
dispute." Also, judicial resolution of a labor dispute has been criti-
cized as being inconsistent with the concept of self-regulation inherent
in the arbitration process." Interference by the courts has been viewed
as being opposed to the voluntariness which is essential to effective
arbitration procedure."
Judicial experience with court orders enforcing arbitrators' desist
orders and awards, however, indicates that injunctive relief would be
a workable remedy in section 301 disputes. 75 In Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291, 76 a
union refused to comply with an arbitrator's interpretation of a pro-
vision in the contract in dispute. In response to the employer's peti-
tion for injunctive relief, the district court issued a decree reauiring
that the previously issued arbitrator's award be specifically enforced
117 398 U.S. at 248.
68 Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and
Discipline, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 239, 252-54 (1966). For an example of delays
possible in damage suits as an alternative to injunctive relief see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v.
Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
60 Dunau, supra note 66, at 465.
70 U.S. Department of Labor, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grievance
Procedures, BLS 1425-6 (1966).
77 Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part	 A Critique, 50 Va. L. Rev.
1147, 1157-158 (1964).
72 See Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 550 (1963).
75 Shulman, Reason, Contract And Law In Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L, Rev. 999,
1024 (1955).
74 Dunau, supra note 66, at 467.
75 See Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958), and Pacific
Marine Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 304 F. Sum.
1315 (N.D. Cal. 1969), as examples of judicial enforcement of arbitrators' cease and
desist orders.
76 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 US. 64 (1967).
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against the union. In upholding this decree," the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit implicitly affirmed a negative order against the
strike. Such enforcement of an arbitrator's award was recognized in
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers" as
being grounded upon the established policy of enforcing arbitration
agreements. The court in New Orleans, in enforcing an arbitrator's
order against a strike in breach of a no-strike clause, reasoned that
failure to enforce this type of contractual agreement would render
arbitration agreements conditioned upon no-strike clauses ineffectual
and "hollow.""
This necessity for enforcing cease and desist orders to preserve
the vitality of arbitration agreements applies with equal force to
breaches of those agreements unaccompanied by arbitrator's orders.
There is little functional difference between the injunctive enforce-
ment of a no-strike provision which expressly allows for a cease and
desist order, and an affirmative court order enforcing an arbitrator's
decision to terminate a strike. As the Court in Boys Markets noted,
both methods of enforcement follow the contractual approach of en-
forcing obligations freely undertaken by the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement. 8° Because of this functional similarity, the
successful judicial experience in enforcing cease and desist orders
lends support to the use of injunctive relief to enforce effectively arbi-
tration agreements.
The decision to allow federal injunctive relief to enforce con-
tractual agreements to arbitrate was carefully conditioned by the
Court in Boys Markets to preserve the bargaining position of the
parties involved. The Court expressly adopted the guidelines suggested
in the dissenting opinion in Sinclair81 in an effort to limit judicial inter-
ference with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in dis-
pute. This explicit narrowness of the holding in Boys Markets has led
to thorough consideration of equitable guidelines in recent district
court decisions involving requests for injunctive relief in actions brought
77 Id. at 299-300.
78 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
To Id. at 372.
80 398 U.S. at 252-53.
81 The Sinclair Court stated:
A District Court entertaining an action under is 301 may not grant injunctive
relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one
in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no in-
junctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the
employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunc-
tion against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider
whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles
of equity whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threat-
ened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable
injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance. 370 U.S. at 228,
cited in 398 U.S. at 254.
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under section 301. In Holland Construction Co., Inc. v. Operating
Eng'rs, Local 101, 82
 a state court issued a temporary restraining
order forbidding picketing by the defendant union in breach of a no-
strike clause. The union removed the case to a federal district court
and sought dissolution of the injunction. The district court denied
this request, and affirmed the injunction on the condition that the order
contain the requirement established in Boys Markets that the em-
ployer be ordered to arbitrate. 88 Similar concern for equitable safe-
guards in application of the Boys Markets decision was demonstrated
in Stroehmann Bros. Co. v. Local 427.84 In Stroehmann, the employer
moved for a preliminary injunction in district court against the defen-
dant union for alleged violation of a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement. The court noted that the Boys Markets opinion
had expressly adopted the guideline in the Sinclair dissent requiring
that a contract be specifically enforceable against both the union and
the employer before injunctive relief will issue. 88 The Stroehmann
court then examined the arbitration agreement in dispute and found
that by its provisions only the union was compelled to arbitrate
grievances." The court then denied injunctive relief since specific en-
forceability against both parties, as required by Boys Markets, was
not present." These lower court interpretations indicate that the
narrow use of injunctive relief proscribed in Boys Markets is both an
effective and equitable means of enforcement of arbitration agreements.
In conclusion, it is submitted that while the decision in Boys
Markets does reconcile the Norris-LaGuardia Act with injunctive
relief in section 301 disputes, it does not totally remove section 301
controversies from anti-injunction coverage. The Boys Markets deci-
sion applies only to situations involving collective bargaining contracts
which contain mandatory grievance or arbitration provisions. This
specific type of controversy appears sufficiently insulated from the
judicial abuses toward which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was directed.
The decision thus does not undermine the policies behind the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, while it does emphasize and strengthen arbitration as
an effective method for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
Therefore, one effect of the Boys Markets decision should be to trans-
form the collective bargaining agreement into a more viable contract,
equally binding upon both parties, since no-strike clauses may be en-
forced by federal injunctive relief. In addition, the method of statutory
interpretation utilized by the majority in Boys Markets to accommo-
date Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, may serve as a forecast of future
labor policy changes. The Court's focus upon the total corpus of federal
82 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,455 (1970).
83 Id. at 19,457.
84 74 L.R.R.M. 2957 (1970).
88 Id. at 2959.
88 Id. at 2959-960.
BT Id. at 2960.
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labor policy as the area of concern, rather than on the language of a
particular statute itself, raises the possibility of further judicial accom-
modation of other statutes which are not responsive to immediate
labor developments. Because labor legislation is an infrequent occur-
rence in itself, and most labor policy is accumulated through judicial
decisions, the Boys Markets liberalization of statutory interpretation
can be expected to prompt further alterations in federal labor policy.
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